Very well researched and thought provoking - Rated 
Based on previous reviews, I was looking forward to reading this book and was not disappointed. It is extremely well researched and certainly changed many of my perceptions about the battle - even down to the difficulty of verifying what ship was where, when it did what, to whom, and how often! In my naivety, I assumed that ships' positions and course changes were fairly well known, and agreed, from my previous dabblings. Mr. Gordon's book certainly paid put to that misconception on my part! I found the part of the book dealing with the workings of the Victorian Navy fascinating, too, and certainly relevant in putting the thinking of some of the senior officers involved into context. One, very slight, criticism I would make is that there is not enough reference to the German senior officers', and German Navy's, background to the battle. I had understood that Jellicoe was aware that the quality of German ships was better than their equivalents in the Royal Navy and this had, also, a bearing on his actions that day and that he was very concerned with maximising his concentration of force, at all times, to offset this. I assume from the lack of comment by Mr. Gordon on this that I am incorrect in this assumption?
The only other, again very slight, comment I would level at the book is the lack of detail on previous North Sea encounters between the two navies. It was, primarily, only Beatty's battlecruiser fleet that had fired their guns in anger and been in major action against the Germans and, on more than one occasion. No exercise can reproduce that sort of experience. Jellicoe, for all his theorising, had not had that sort of opportunity and he, as history proved, had to get it "right first (and only) time". Beatty had previous encounters to draw upon and there is a valid question, to my mind, as to whether he had learnt sufficient lessons from those.
Excellent book, well researched and written - Rated 
Half of it contains one of the best (and readable) accounts of Jutland ever published. However the book's distinguishing features are:
-the analysis of the amazing social connections between the top RN officers of the time (Beatty, Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas, among others) and how (according to the author) these relationships affected their operational performance;
-the detailed explanation of some RN inner workings and tactical procedures;
-the in depth analysis of some relevant historical antecedents to Jutland.
Including extensive notes and bibliography, this book is not to be missed by anyone with interest on the late 19th-early 20th century Royal Navy.
Thorough but flawed - Rated 
Andrew Gordon writes a convincing analysis of the action and presents a well-researched picture of the late Victorian Navy's processes, but it is in putting these two things together that The Rules of the Game falls down. In presenting what are essentially conspiracy theories on the influence of masons, torpedo specialists, bureaucrats and (bizarrely) polar explorers, his 'explanation' of why Jutland was not another Trafalgar loses focus. Fans of revisionism will like this, but for serious scholars of naval history, there are better analyses of Jutland. Essentially, the book is let down by wading, seventy years too late and entirely pointlessly, into the Beatty-vs-Jellicoe spat. While he tries to be objective Gordon can't help glossing over both Beatty's failings and Jellicoe's successes in the name of making a point.
Regulators V's Rat Catchers - Rated
As some reviewers have already mentioned, this is ,primarily, a book that investigates why so many potential tactical initiatives were not taken advantage of by the various Royal Navy Senior Officers.
Admiral Beatty usually gets the sharp end of the stick in any 'historical' writing of either Dogger Bank or Jutland, but this book, does, in some detail, show exactly why he rose to the highest office - where he later ruined his 'name' by the adjusting the facts to reflect better on the Battlecruiser forces, that aside, the practical results of his command approach are not in doubt (except where gunnery practices are concerned and also some foolish 'downwards loyalty').
Jellicoe is shown, effectively, to be the product of his time, nothing more, nothing less. In this readers opinion, this does him little justice, but, like all histories with a point to prove - something else has to be disproved to make room (the equilibrium argument).
The only minus for me was the overindulgent reams of paper on the historical relationship between Evans-Thomas and the Royal Family, the research was obviously (very) thorough and accurate, but did we really need to have so much detail printed in the book in order to understand the point..?
Worth much more than the cost if RN history/WW1 is something that is of interest to you.
A must-read for all managers and politicians - Rated
The book leads you into the battle and suddenly flips back 20 or so years to lead you through the changes in the Royal Navy from then until the battle. Why? This will become clear as you read but in short it is to do with the battles between theorists and practitioners, and between those who follow process and those who want the product. It shows that in the end the theorists and process fanatics came out on top and that Jutland, whilst still a strategic victory, was not the annihilation of the German fleet that it should have been, and which may have changed the progress of the war. This is a book to read once you are already aware of the the broad details of the battle and the outline history of the sea war between Britain and Germany.
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